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ABSTRACT 
Research has shown that groups tend to be less cooperative in prisoner’s dilemma 
games compared to individuals.  One hypothesis to explain this effect stems from groups’ 
natural tendencies to protect themselves from harm and enhance their relative standing.  
However, an alternative hypothesis is that groups are more rational in game situations.  
The current study attempted to distinguish between these two hypotheses by testing 
whether groups score higher than individuals on measures of competitiveness and pro-
self (group) behavior, and lower than individuals on measures of prosocial behavior.  The 
study also attempted to assess whether the pro-self tendencies of groups lead them to 
behave less ethically than individuals.   I tested these hypotheses by using decomposed 
games and ethical dilemma problems.  The results showed that groups were less prosocial 
than individuals and less likely than individuals to make the ethical choice in one of the 
two ethical dilemmas.  Implications and future research directions are discussed.   
	  	  	  	  
1	  
CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 An enduring issue in social psychology is how individuals’ behavior changes 
when carried out in a group context. Allport (1924) referred to this as the central question 
in social psychology.  Much research has shown that group membership plays a dynamic 
role in shaping individual behavior (Abrams & Hogg, 1988).  Recent work in this area 
has focused on the dynamics of relationships between cooperation and competitive dur-
ing inter-individuals and inter-groups’ interactions. Based on decades of studies, it has 
been shown that interactions between groups are more competitive than comparable in-
teractions between individuals (Wildschut, et al. 2003).  
Recently, several ethical scandals appeared in the business field, and the organiza-
tions’ unethical behaviors have drawn society’s attention as well as researchers’. Organi-
zational decisions are often made by groups, so it may be worthwhile to understand how 
groups may differ from single individuals in terms of ethical decision making. The pro-
posed research will compare individuals and groups both in terms of their orientation to-
ward social exchanges (i. e., “social value orientation”, McClintock, 1978) and how they 
resolve ethical dilemmas. 
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Social Value Orientation 
Social Value orientation is defined as stable preferences for systematically differ-
ent patterns of outcomes for individuals (MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; McClintock, 
1978). There are various categories to identify one’s social value orientation (Van 
langekuhlman, 1994, Liebrand & Run 1983). In the current research, we will use three 
categories of social value orientations, prosocials, individuals and competitors. Here, pro-
socials tend to maximize outcomes for both themselves and others, as well as to minimize 
outcome difference between themselves and others. Individuals tend to maximize their 
own outcomes, and they have little or no regard for others’ outcomes.  Competitors try to 
maximize the difference between their own and others’ outcomes, thus insuring that they 
“win”, but minimize other’s outcome. These different patterns of social orientation are 
shaped by social interaction experiences (Van Lange, Otten Wilma, De Brun, & Jorire-
man, 1997). 
Different social orientation types will influence people’s behavior in a variety of 
social situations.  Much of the research on social value orientation has focused on social 
dilemmas (Dawes, 1980).  Social dilemmas are situations that pit individual outcomes 
against collective outcomes, such that individuals get their best outcomes by defecting 
from the collective, but if everyone defects, everyone is worse off.  In addition, the best 
overall collective outcome occurs when everyone cooperates with the collective. Re-
search has demonstrated that people who are prosocials tend toward being cooperative 
during the dilemma tasks.  However, individualists and competitors tend to defect in such 
tasks thus lowering the collective payoff (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Liebrand & Van 
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Run, 1985; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 
1994).   More recent research (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) has shown that negotiators 
with pro-social orientations are better at findings “win-win” solutions in negotiated set-
tlements.  Individualist (i.e., pro-selfs) and competitors tended to miss chances for mutu-
ally beneficial tradeoffs and not realize the presence of compatible issues.  It appears that 
focusing only on winning and/or self-relevant outcomes can lead to suboptimal outcomes.  
Discontinuity effect 
One of the most consistent findings in the group decision making literature is that 
groups exacerbate tendencies prevalent among the individuals from which the group 
members were drawn (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997).  Probably the most well known 
phenomenon consistent with this finding is “group polarization” (Kameda, Tindale, & 
Davis, 2003; Myers & Lamm, 1976).  In a situation where groups are taking a position 
along some continuum, groups will choose a position more extreme (closer to the poll or 
endpoint) than the average of the individual pre-group positions.  The pole they will 
move toward is the one for which most of the individuals were originally leaning (Myers 
& Lamm, 1976).  However, there are exceptions to this general finding where groups 
tend to behave in ways inconsistent with or opposite the general trend at the individual 
level.  These have been referred to as “discontinuity” effects.  According to Brown’s 
(1954) “the quality of mob behavior has always required explanation because of its ap-
parent discontinuity with the private characters of the individuals involved.” 
Probably the best know discontinuity effect has been referred to as the “inter-
individual – inter-group discontinuity effect” (Schopler, et. al. 2001). Schopler et al com-
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pared individuals and three-person groups in terms of how they play a prisoner’s dilem-
ma game when the two parties are allowed to communicate.  Individuals tended to agree 
to cooperate and then did cooperate most of the time when actually making their choices.  
However, groups agreed to cooperate but then tended to defect.  Rather than exacerbating 
the individual tendency, groups tended to do the opposite of what they most likely would 
have done as individuals: thus the “discontinuity”.  This general effect has now been rep-
licated dozens of times under a variety of different circumstances and mixed motive 
game environments (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko & Schopler, 2003).  Morgan and 
Tindale (2002) found that the effect had at least two components.  First, individuals were 
slightly more likely to choose to defect if they thought they would be playing against a 
group.  However, the majority of group members initial preferences were still for cooper-
ation before group discussion.  During group discussion, the members who favored de-
fection were more persuasive and typically convinced the other group members to vote to 
defect.  Thus, groups often defected even when most of their members initially favored 
cooperation.  It appears that norms for group protection and enhancement are quite strong 
even in a laboratory group (Tindale, Talbot, & Martinez, 2013).  Such norms probably 
arise from the same feelings of group identity posited by social identity theory (Abrams 
& Hogg, 1988). 
Unethical Behavior in Groups 
There is now a growing body of evidence that groups are more likely to behave 
unethically than are individuals under similar circumstances.  Stawiski, Tindale & 
Dykema-Engblade (2009) demonstrated that, in a negotiation task, groups were more 
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likely to lie to negotiation partners than were individuals.  When deception can be used 
strategically used, groups will show more deceptive choices. For instance, Cohen, Gunia, 
Kim-Jun and Murnighan (2009) found that when deception helped to maximize outcomes, 
participants playing as a group sent more misleading messages (thus deceit) to their op-
ponents to achieve maximum economic gains than when participants played as individu-
als.  
Moreover, different members in the groups serve different roles, such as, mem-
bers, leader, and the like. They are all willing to act competitively for achieving the group 
goal. As a group member, core members are more willing to help the group (Tyler & 
Blader, 2000). Meanwhile, in order to accomplish the organizational goals, leaders can 
potentially encourage corruption and unethical acts within their organizations (Brown & 
Mitchell, 2010). Also, peripheral member are more motivated than core members to show 
loyalty to the group (Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, &McKimmie, 2003). Van Kleef ‘s 
(2007) work in intergroup negotiation is also informative. Their study showed that: when 
peripheral members were selected as representatives in an intergroup negotiation, and 
when they were accountable, they adopted more competitive and less cooperative strate-
gies compared with the core group members (Van Kleef, Steinel, van Knippenberg, Hogg, 
& Svensson, 2007).  
Ethical decision-making in organizations 
The contemporary research in ethical decision-making of individuals is related to 
situational variables. Trevino’s (1986) person-situation interactionist model discussed the 
fact that ethical or unethical decision making should depend on factors within the indi-
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vidual and factors within the situation. As we discussed above, relying on individual de-
cision- making as the sole reason for unethical behavior in organizations is not viable. 
Situational variables in the social context can heavily influenced individual’s ethical de-
cision-making (Trevino, 1986).  
One of the main context factors that have been studied is ethical climate.  Ethical 
climate has been defined as “the prevailing perceptions of typical organizational practic-
es and procedures that have ethical content” or “those aspects of work climate that de-
termine what constitutes ethical behavior at work” (Victor & Cullen, 1988, p 101). When 
group people interact with each other, the ethical climate will influence their decision 
making. Previous researches have demonstrated that ethical climate dimensions can posi-
tively influence managers’ ethical decision-making intentions (Flannery & May, 2000). 
In contrast, ethical climate dimensions are negatively related with people’s willingness to 
lie (Ross & Robertson, 2000). Moreover, Aquino (1998) found that ethical climate would 
make people behave in a more honest way in negotiation. An ethical climate can also ef-
fectively reduce individual’s lying behavior that would serve their own interests (Ross & 
Robertson, 2000).  
In-group love and out-group hate 
When the group acts more competitively than the individual to out-groups, limited 
resources could be a possible reason from an evolutionary perspective. Thus, when re-
sources are limited, intergroup interactions will be more competitive and aggressive. The 
emotional reaction will turn to out-group hate. De Dreu et al (2011) demonstrated that 
oxytocin drives a “tend and defend” response in that it promoted in-group trust and coop-
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eration, and defensive, but not offensive, aggression toward competing out-groups. Also, 
an empirical study conducted by Insko et al. (1992) demonstrated that groups would ra-
ther establish their superiority to the other group than to maximize their absolute in-group 
profit. Moreover, these kinds of intergroup biases can occur as a result of elevation of the 
in-group, or derogation of the out-group, or both (Levin & Sidanius, 1999). However, 
Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein (2011) found that group members strongly preferred in-
group love than out-group hate, which is more cooperative within their in-groups and less 
competitive during intergroup interactions.  
 In sum, the literature from group competition and ethical behavior suggested that: 
1. Intergroup interaction is more competitive than interindividual interaction. 2. People in 
the group situations tend to more unethical. 3. Group members are cooperative within 
group, but competitive and hostile towards out-group.   This would seem to imply that 
groups are prosocials when dealing with ingroup issues, but maybe more proself  (at the 
group level) or competitive when dealing with outgroup issues.  However, this has never 
been directly assessed.  The research presented here will attempt to directly test this hy-
pothesis using a slightly modified version of the social value orientation measure previ-
ously discussed (Van Lange, 1999).  Groups will be asked to respond to the various out-
come matrices and make choices but in the context of an intergroup setting.  In other 
words, groups and group members will be asked to choose outcome distributions for 
themselves as a group and for the other group.  This will allow for the categorization of 
groups as prosocials, proselfs (pro-group) or competitors.  Both individuals and groups 
will also be asked to respond to two ethical decision scenarios.  I predict that groups will 
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score less prosocial than individuals and will respond less ethically to the scenarios.  In 
addition, I will assess whether the responses to the social value orientation scale are relat-
ed to the ethical decision scenario responses.  	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CHAPTER TWO  
INDIVIDUAL- GROUP COMPARISONS ON SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION AND 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 
Method  
Participants 
 Two hundred and six participants were recruited from introductory psychology 
classes in Loyola University Chicago. All participants received course credit for their 
participation. Demographically, 70% of the participants were female, 60% were white, 
and they ranged in age from 18 to 20 years old. Overall, 71 participants were assigned to 
the individual condition, 135 participants were assigned to the three persons group condi-
tion, while 3 individuals were excluded because they didn’t finish all the tasks. There 
were 12 individuals whose responses did not fit in any of the SVO categories. There were 
also 12 groups and 15 group members whose responses did not fit in any of the SVO cat-
egories.    
Materials and Procedures 
 We used a series of decomposed games to test people’s social value orientation 
(Van Lange, et al., 1997).  Participants were asked to choose among three outcome distri-
butions for each of nine decomposed games. The three choices involved equal outcomes 
for self and other (or my group and other group), maximum outcomes for self (group), or 
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maximum difference between self (group) and other (other group).   Individuals and 
groups were classified as prosocial, proself, or competitive if they made six of nine 
choices following one of the response types.  Thus, they were defined as prosocial if they 
chose equal outcomes six time, proself if they chose the maximum outcomes for self six 
times, or competitive if they chose maximum difference six times.  Individuals and 
groups that did not consistently choose one of the option types could not be scored.  This 
measure of social value orientation has been demonstrated to have good internal con-
sistency and test- retest reliability (Van Lange, et al., 1997).  The appendix contains the 
actual decomposed games used. After participants finished the games, they were tested 
on two ethical dilemmas. One scenario involved a person (or a group) at a cocktail party 
where an acquaintance from a pharmaceutical firm drunkenly brags the FDA is about to 
approve his company’s game-changing drug. The second scenario was about a contractor 
(or a group of contractors) have finished a long negotiation with a city about a new shop-
ping mall and a hotel complex for the tax break because of the high cost materials. How-
ever, they found a cheap alternative material afterward. The full descriptions about the 
dilemmas can be found in the appendix.  
The participants in the group condition made decisions for their group in the de-
composed games and ethical dilemmas first as individuals. Then the groups discussed the 
games and the ethical scenarios and reached a group consensus for each one. In the indi-
vidual condition, each participant responded to all the games and ethical dilemma indi-
vidually.  
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Results  
We conducted Chi-square tests with the types of decision maker (individuals, 
groups, & group members) as the independent variables, on the social value orientation 
(prosocials vs. individualists vs. competitors) and the ethical decision (ethical vs. unethi-
cal) as the dependent variables. Here, the group means the responses which trios made 
together for their group, and the group members means the responses which trios made 
by themselves for their group. First, the analysis revealed that the social value orientation 
significantly differ between individuals and groups (𝜒2(2)=9.105, p< .05). There were 
significantly more individuals (42.9%) that are prosocials than groups (14.7%), (Z=NAN, 
p< .01) in their social value orientations. There were significantly more groups (50.0%) 
that were competitive than individuals (25%), (Z=-3.65, p< .01). The results also showed 
that the social value orientation significantly differed between individuals and group 
members (𝜒2(2)=11.452, p< .01). According to post-hoc tests, individuals tended to be 
more prosocial (42.9%) than group members (23.3%), (Z=NAN, p< .01), and the group 
members (50.8%) tended to be more competitive than individuals (25%). However, there 
was no significant difference between groups and group members (𝜒2(2)=1.853, p= .396). 
(See Table 1.) 
 Table 1. Social Value Orientation in different decision maker 
  Prosocial Individualistic Competitive Total 
Individuals 24 (42.9%) 18 (32.1%) 14 (25.0%) 56 
Groups 5 (15.2%) 12 (36.4%) 16 (48.5%) 33 
Group 
members 28 (23.3%) 31 (25.8%) 61 (50.8%) 120 
Total 57 (27.3%) 61 (29.2%) 91 (43.5%) 209 
The results also showed that individuals and groups went different ways in their 
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decision makings in the first ethical dilemma; significantly more groups (55.9%) made 
the unethical judgment than did individuals (21.4%), (𝜒2(1)=11.122, p< .01). This situa-
tion also happened with group members, with more group members (51.7%) making the 
unethical judgment compared to individuals (21.4%), (𝜒2(1)=14.327, p< .01). Moreover, 
slightly more groups (54.5%) made the unethical decision than did group members 
(51.7%), although this difference was not significant (𝜒2(1)= .086, p= .769).  
Regarding the second ethical dilemma, there were no differences between indi-
viduals, groups and group members: more than 70% of participants chose ethical deci-
sions regardless of conditions. Numerically, however, there were slightly more groups 
(82.4%) that acted ethically than individuals (73.2%), (𝜒2(1)= .442, p= .233).    
However, we didn’t find significant effect between social value orientation and 
ethical decision making. For individuals, there was no significant difference between par-
ticipants’ social value orientation and the first ethical decision making, 𝜒2(2)=1.992, 
p= .369, as well as in the second ethical dilemma, 𝜒2(2)=1.012, p= .603. For groups, there 
was similarly no significant effect between groups’ social value orientation and the first 
decision making, 𝜒2(2)=.036, p= .982, as well as no significant effect in the second ethi-
cal dilemma, 𝜒2(2)=1.069, p= .586. We had initially predicted that SVO would mediate 
the relationship between decision maker (individual vs. group) and their choices on the 
ethical dilemmas, but since there was no effect of SVO on the ethical dilemma responses, 
SVO could not have mediated the effect. 
The results also revealed that the groups’ social value orientation was influenced 
by the social context (i.e., distribution of member preferences). For each item in the SVO 
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measure the social context heavily influenced the group’s social value orientation. There 
was very little evidence of minority influence and majority processes were modal in all 
nine cases (see Figure 1).   
Figure 1. The conformity effect in social value orientation  
   
Moreover, in both ethical dilemmas, we can see a similar pattern of results.  When 
group members interacted with each other, their final decisions reached were significant-
ly influenced by the majority in the groups. The groups also conform to the majority 
when they made decision in the ethical dilemmas, regardless of whether the decision was 
ethical or unethical. (See figure 2.)    
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Figure 2: The conformity effect in ethical decision making  
  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the group member preference distributions and the final 
group decisions for the SVO and ethical dilemma decisions.  The data are fairly con-
sistent with majority decision process in that majorities typically defined the group’s final 
decision.  However, for the SVO decisions, there is evidence that two person majorities 
favoring the competitive choice were somewhat more influential than two person majori-
ties favoring the other alternatives.  A two-person majority favoring the competitive 
choice defined the group’s final choice 63% of the time, while two-person majorities fa-
voring the proself choice won out only 54% of the time, (Z=1.11, p< .05). Two-person 
majorities favoring the prosocial response defined the group choice only 52% of the time, 
(Z=1.38, p< .05) (see Table 2).  Thus, the group decision process showed a slight bias 
toward the competitive choice.  No apparent asymmetries in the group decision processes 
for the ethical dilemma problems were found, although the samples sizes were quite 
small for many of the member distributions (see Tables 3 and 4).   
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Table 2.  Participants distribution in social value orientation                                         
                          
  
 
      SVO of group members 
Prosocial/Individualistic/Competitor 
 
 
 
 
SVO of groups 
 
 
 
 
Prosocial Individualistic Competitor 
0/0/3 2 0 45 
0/1/2 3 30 49 
0/2/1 1 21 11 
0/3/0 3 5 2 
1/0/2 6 7 29 
1/2/0 9 7 2 
1/1/1 31 56 18 
2/1/0 10 9 3 
2/0/1 19 11 3 
3/0/0 10 1 0 
Note: The first column shows the participants’ SVO type distribution in group members, 
which was how the participants distribute in social value orientation when they made de-
cision for their group individually. For example 0/0/3 means that there was zero member 
in prosocial category, zero member in individualistic category, and three members in the 
competitor category. The number in the table showed the actual frequency of groups’ de-
cision making. Therefore, the first row represents the situation where a group had no pro-
social or individualistic, but three competitors group members. Of the 47 groups that 
started out with such a member distribution, two groups chose mainly prosocial outcomes 
and 45 groups chose mainly the competition outcomes.           
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Table 3. Participants distribution in ethical dilemma 1                                        
 
 
 
Ethical Decision making of 
Group members 
Ethical/Unethical 
 
Ethical Decision making of groups   
                                   
 
Ethical             Unethical 
0/3 2 6 
1/2 2 11 
2/1 14 3 
3/0 6 1 
Note: The first column shows how group members distributed themselves when they 
made decision in the ethical dilemma. For example, 0/3 means there was no member who 
chose the ethical response, while there were three members who chose the unethical re-
sponses. The numbers in this table mean the frequency of the groups’ decision making. 
Therefore, the first row showed when all the members chose unethical response in the 
ethical dilemma, there were 2 groups that chose the ethical response, and 6 groups that 
chose the unethical response.     
Table 4. Participants distribution in ethical dilemma 2                                         
 
 
Ethical Decision making of 
Group members 
Ethical/Unethical 
 
Ethical Decision making of groups 
 
 
Ethical              Unethical 
0/3 0 0 
1/2 3 4 
2/1 14 3 
3/0 20 1 
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Discussion  
The present study aimed to compare individuals and groups in terms of their pro-
pensity to act in unethical ways. The study directly compared individual and group choic-
es on two ethical dilemma tasks.  In addition, the study attempted to assess whether 
changes in social value orientation when acting as a member of a group could explain the 
tendency for groups to be less ethical than individuals. The findings concerning social 
value orientation were consistent with our hypothesis that individual participants will act 
more pro-socially than group participants. Individuals making judgments for themselves 
tended to make prosocial choices more often than any other category. However, individu-
als making choices for their group tended to choose either the proself or the competitive 
payoff.  When groups made collective choices, the modal response was competitive and 
the least likely choice was prosocial. These results are consistent with work comparing 
individuals and groups in actual prisoner’s dilemma games where groups are far less like-
ly to cooperate compared to individuals (Wildschut et al, 2003; Morgan & Tindale, 2002).  
These result show that groups and group members’ orientation to the games are more 
competitive and less prosocial than are the orientations of most individuals.  The fact that 
groups tended more toward the competitive orientation, as opposed to simply being more 
proself, indicates that groups not only care less about other groups’ outcomes, but they 
also want to insure that their group does much better than the other group.  In the current 
context, groups showed both more in-group favoritism and more out-group harm.  
 The SVO findings are consistent with participants’ responses to the ethical di-
lemmas, at least the first one. Groups and group members were much more likely to 
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choose to use insider information when making an investment than were individuals.  
Such findings are consistent with past research that has shown groups more likely to lie 
in negotiations (Stawiski et al, 2009). However, when groups and group members were 
asked whether they would remain quiet about finding cheaper sources for materials after 
a negotiation, they were less likely than individual to do so. Nevertheless, the group, the 
group members, and the individuals are significantly more ethical in this scenario. Alt-
hough it is not exactly clear why the two ethical dilemmas led to different results, prelim-
inary analyses of the group discussions seem to indicate that both group members and 
individuals thought keeping quiet was somehow illegal (which it is not). Interestingly, 
insider trading is illegal, but it appears most participants did not realize this. Obviously, 
future research will be necessary to further examine how individuals and groups respond 
to different types of ethical dilemmas and how the dimensions underlying the various di-
lemmas potentially affect individuals and groups differently.   
Two other aspects of the results are notable. First, although groups were both 
more competitively oriented and less ethical (at least on one dilemma) as predicted, the 
shift in social value orientation did not mediate the results for the ethical dilemma. It was 
assumed that the change in SVO when moving from the individual to the group level 
would produce the unethical tendencies in the groups. The lack of evidence of mediation 
implies that variables other than SVO must be involved to explain the individual – group 
differences found here.  Second, unlike past research looking at individual – group differ-
ences in game playing and lying (Stawiski et al., 2009; Morgan & Tindale, 2002), the dif-
ferences found here seem mainly a function of changes in the behavior of the group 
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members. Past research has shown that minority factions in groups that favor the more 
competitive or less ethical response are particularly persuasive during group discussions 
and this leads groups to choose the less ethical responses more often than expected.  No 
such minority influence was seen in the current results. There was some evidence that 
competitive majorities on the SVO questions were somewhat more influential that other 
types of majorities, but overall minority influence in the ethical dilemmas was rather rare.  
In addition, none of the tasks produced differences between the group responses and the 
initial responses of their members. Thus, the major change in perspective seemed to oc-
cur when individuals shifted from playing or deciding for just themselves, to playing or 
deciding for their group.   
The current findings support the notions that groups are naturally more competi-
tive and, at least in some cases, less ethical than individuals. However, further research 
will be necessary to isolate the specific psychological and social processes that underlie 
the responses tendencies discovered here. Future research should also focus on why 
group members responded differently than individuals for the social value orientation 
questions. Is it simply that they were making decisions for their group, or would individ-
ual preferences change just because they are now in a group but making decisions for 
themselves? A greater focus on the content of the group discussions would also be 
worthwhile for future research endeavors. Another potential way to extend the present 
study would be to investigate people’s actual ethical behavior instead of examining ethi-
cal judgments. For instance, research could test whether people as a group are more likely 
to deceive their opponents or cheat to increase their gains, relative to the similar individ-
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uals working alone. Given the importance of fair and ethical behavior in organizations, 
gaining a better understanding of how group membership influence such behavior should 
continue to be a focus of research. 	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AN INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION FOR 
 
INDIVIDUALS 
  
21 
 
In this game, we want you to imagine that you play with another person, who has 
been randomly paired with you. We simplify another person as  “Other”, who you do not 
know for now, as well as will not know in future. In this task, both you and the “Other” 
will make choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your choices will gain points 
for both yourself and “Other”. Meanwhile, the other’s choice will produce points for 
he/she and for you. Every point has value, the more points you get, the better results you 
receive, and the same for the “Other”. 
 
Here's an example of how this game works: 
 
               A    B    C 
You get 500 500 550 
Other gets 100 500 300 
 
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the “Other” 
would receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the “Other” 
500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the “Other” 300. So, you see 
that your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of 
points the “Other” receives. 
Before you start the game, please remember that there are no right or wrong 
answers. You can choose the option that you prefer most, for whatever reason. Also, 
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remember that the points have value: The more value you accumulate in all, the better 
for you. Likewise, from the “Other’s” point of view, the more points he/she accumulate, 
the better for he/she. 
For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending on which 
column you prefer most: 
 
                         A       B        C                         
(1) You get     480    540    480   
   Other gets    80     280     480         
 
 (2) You get    560    500    500  
   Other gets    300    500    100  
 
 (3) You get    520    520    580  
    Other gets   520    120    320  
 
 (4) You get    500    560    490  
    Other gets   100    300    490  
 
 (5) You get    560    500    490 
    Other gets   300    500     90 
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(6) You get     500    500    570 
   Other gets    500    100    300 
 
(7) You get     510    560    510 
   Other gets    510    300    110 
 
(8) You get     550    500    500 
   Other gets    300    100    500 
 
(9) You get     480    490    540 
   Other gets    100    490    300 
 
Note. Participants are classified when they make 6 or more consistent choices. Prosocial choices are lc, 2b, 
3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, 9b; individualistic choices are lb, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, 9c; and competitive 
choices are la, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, 9a. 
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In this task, we ask you to imagine that you are a person at a cocktail party. After 
reading the scenario, you will make choice by circling “Yes” or “No”. Before you start, 
please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. You can choose the option 
that you prefer most, for whatever reason. 
 
You are at a cocktail party where an acquaintance from a pharmaceutical firm 
drunkenly brags the FDA is about to approve his company’s game-changing drug. The 
next day you buy shares of the company. Would you do this? 
Yes, I will buy shares of the company.  
No, I won’t buy shares of the company. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ETHICAL DILEMMA SCENARIO 2 FOR INDIVIDUALS 
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In this task, we ask you to imagine that you are a contractor of contractors. After 
reading the scenario, you will make choice by circling “Yes” or “No”. Before you start, 
please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. You can choose the option 
that you prefer most, for whatever reason. 
 
You are a contractor and you have finished a long negotiation with a city about a 
new shopping mall and hotel complex.  During the negotiation, you convinced the city to 
provide you with major tax breaks because the materials you would need for building 
were very expensive and you needed the tax breaks in order to make a profit.  Since you 
have signed the agreement, you have found a new source for building materials that is 
considerably cheaper than the source you quoted during the negotiations.  Should you go 
back to the city to renegotiate the level of tax breaks or simply keep quite about the 
cheaper costs and keep the additional profits? 
Yes, we will go back to the city to renegotiate the level of tax breaks. 
No, we will keep quiet about the cheaper costs and keep the additional profits. 
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AN INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION FOR GROUPS
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In this game, we want you to imagine that you play with another group, who has 
been randomly paired with your group. We simplify another group as “Other group”, 
who you do not know for now, as well as will not know in future. In this task, both your 
group and the “Other group” will make choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. 
Your choices will gain points for both your group and “Other group”. Meanwhile, the 
other’s choice will produce points for them and for you. Every point has value, the more 
points you get, the better results your group receives, and the same for the “Other group”. 
 
Here's an example of how this game works: 
 
               A    B    C 
You get 500 500 550 
Other gets 100 500 300 
 
In this example, if you chose A your group would receive 500 points and the 
“Other group” would receive 100 points; if you chose B, your group would receive 500 
points and the “Other group” 500; and if you chose C, your group would receive 550 
points and the “Other group” 300. So, you see that your choice influences both the 
number of points your group receive and the number of points the “Other group” 
receives. 
Before you start the game, please remember that there are no right or wrong 
answers. You can choose the option that you prefer most, for whatever reason. Also, 
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remember that the points have value: The more value you accumulate in all, the better 
for your group. Likewise, from the “Other group’s” point of view, the more points they 
accumulate, the better for them. 
For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending on which 
column you prefer most: 
 
                                    A       B        C                         
(1) Your group gets     480    540    480   
   Other group gets    80     280     480         
 
 (2) Your group gets    560    500    500  
    Other group gets    300    500    100  
 
 (3) Your group gets    520    520    580  
     Other group gets   520    120    320  
 
 (4) Your group gets    500    560    490  
     Other group gets   100    300    490  
 
 (5) Your group gets    560    500    490 
     Other group gets   300    500     90 
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(6) Your group gets     500    500    570 
    Other group gets    500    100    300 
 
(7) Your group gets     510    560    510 
    Other group gets    510    300    110 
 
(8) Your group gets     550    500    500 
    Other group gets    300    100    500 
 
(9) Your group gets     480    490    540 
    Other group gets    100    490    300 
 
Note. Participants are classified when they make 6 or more consistent choices. Prosocial choices are lc, 2b, 3a, 4c, 
5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, 9b; individualistic choices are lb, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, 9c; and competitive choices are 
la, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, 9a. 
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In this task, we ask you to imagine that you are a group member at a cocktail 
party. After reading the scenario, you will make choice by circling “Yes” or “No”. Before 
you start, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. You can choose 
the option that your group prefers most, for whatever reason. 
 
Your group is at a cocktail party where an acquaintance from a pharmaceutical 
firm drunkenly brags the FDA is about to approve his company’s game-changing drug. 
The next day your group buys shares of the company. Would your group do this? 
Yes, I will buy shares of the company.  
No, I won’t buy shares of the company. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
ETHICAL DILEMMA SCENARIO 2 FOR GROUPS 
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In this task, we ask you to imagine that you are a group of contractors. After 
reading the scenario, you will make choice by circling “Yes” or “No”. Before you start, 
please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. You can choose the option 
that your group prefers most, for whatever reason. 
 
You are a group of contractors and you have finished a long negotiation with a 
city about a new shopping mall and hotel complex.  During the negotiation, your group 
convinced the city to provide you with major tax break because the materials you would 
need for building were very expensive and you needed the tax breaks in order to make a 
profit.  Since your group has signed the agreement, you have found a new source for 
building materials that is considerably cheaper than the source your quoted during the 
negotiations.  Should your group go back to the city to renegotiate the level of tax breaks 
or simply keep quite about the cheaper costs and keep the additional profits? 
Yes, we will go back to the city to renegotiate the level of tax breaks. 
No, we will keep quiet about the cheaper costs and keep the additional profits. 
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